The original text is in EN, taken from the source site. Source ↗

An AI jailbreak package that repeatedly modifies OpenAI Codex instructions to promote its author’s commercial service, showing how guardrail-bypass tools can double as advertising infrastructure.

The Chinese language bundle, Haiou, was discovered on a cybercrime actor’s misconfigured web server alongside Cobalt Strike and penetration testing utilities.

Published November 3, the investigation identifies the technique as prompt adware: changes to trusted agent instructions that influence future responses for commercial or behavioral objectives.

Unlike conventional adware, the advertising mechanism operates through natural language embedded in configuration artifacts rather than executable advertising payloads.

Researchers found Cobalt Strike logs indicating compromises of personal computers belonging to Chinese speaking individuals. The same server hosted Ladon and VulnClaw.

Their presence demonstrates criminal adoption of dual use tooling, but researchers found no evidence linking Haiou’s author to cybercrime.

Its six Skills cover penetration testing, reverse engineering, software license security, memory analysis, laboratory exercises, and game security.

The package is publicly available on GitHub where the user haiou-666 hosts both a version for Codex and Claude Code – as of the time of writing, only the Codex version.

Package contents (Source : Check Point).

Check Point analyzed, Haiou 4.5.0 package presents itself as a local Codex enhancement combining a Chinese technical persona, modular prompts, and security focused Skills.

Launchers for Windows, Linux, and macOS verify the packaged payload using Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hashes, then decrypt it with an embedded AES-256-GCM key.

The resulting ZIP archive is extracted temporarily. This packaging obscures prompt contents from casual repository inspection; researchers suggested avoiding automated scanning as a possible explanation, not a confirmed motive.

The jailbreak modules combine role playing, refusal suppression, and contextual reframing. Some blacklist refusal language or discourage authorization questions, while another recasts offensive security requests as educational Capture The Flag exercises.

These instructions attempt to weaken safeguards; their inclusion does not establish universal bypass effectiveness.

The advertising instruction resides in 00-identity.md and propagates into global agent instruction files.

Greetings and activation terms, including “hi,” “hello,” “ctf,” and “coach,” trigger a prescribed Seagull catchphrase followed by a promotion for zz.aiapi2025.top.

The destination is an opaque, OpenAI compatible LLM gateway access that intermediates between applications and model providers. Researchers assess that the free jailbreak likely serves as an acquisition channel for paid gateway access.

Another module labels the domain “protected infrastructure” and prohibits offensive testing against it, even when users claim authorization.

The package includes an uninstaller that restores original configurations and removes the advertisement.

Claude Code flagging prompt-injection (Source : Check Point).

Although its Codex archive also contains an advertising instruction in CLAUDE.md, researchers reported no ad injection in the separate Haiou Claude repository.

Check Point found no indication that the advertised gateway itself was malicious. However, separate research, “Your Agent Is Mine,” examined 28 paid and 400 free LLM routers, identifying nine that injected malicious code into returned tool calls.

Seventeen free routers also interacted with researcher controlled AWS canary credentials. These findings illustrate intermediary risks without implicating Haiou’s advertised service.

Distribution extends beyond the original repository through Bilibili promotion and Codex-X integration.

Codex-X’s documentation describes visual management of prompts, providers, Skills, and configuration files, illustrating how easily persistent instructions can enter developer workflows.research.

The central finding is that installing a jailbreak can change more than refusal behavior: it can establish a persistent commercial voice inside an agent’s trusted configuration, carrying advertisements into later sessions.

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